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Abstract 
Rubinstein (1988, 2003) and Leland  (1994, 1998, 2001, 2002) have shown that 
choices based on similarity judgments will account for the vast majority of observed 
violations of expected and discounted utility.  In this paper, I show that such 
judgments also explain which equilibria will be selected in single-shot games with 
multiple equilibria, predict circumstances in which non-equilibria outcomes may 
predominate in such games, and predict circumstances in which specific pure strategy 
outcomes will predominate in games with no pure strategy equilibria.   
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 “Games with multiple equilibria require coordination….  Predicting which of 
the many equilibria will be selected is perhaps the most difficult problem in game 
theory.” (Camerer, 2003, pp. 336) 
 
 
Introduction 
A frequently encountered challenge in game theory involves predicting how 
agents will play in games with multiple equilibria. Theorists have proposed a number 
of deductive principles – payoff dominance, risk dominance, security-mindedness - 
people might use to winnow down the available options. None of these criteria 
consistently explain which equilibrium subjects select in experimental settings.  In 
this paper, I take a different tack to address the question of equilibrium selection. 
Specifically, I show that if people base their strategy choices on judgments regarding 
the similarity or dissimilarity of game payoffs, along lines proposed by Rubinstein 
(1988, 2003) and Leland (1994, 1998, 2001, 2002) to explain why people violate the 
axioms of expected utility and discounted utility, then in single-shot games, they may 
systematically select one strategy over another as a function of the relative magnitude 
of game payoffs.2 
 I begin with a short discussion of the consequences of choosing between risky 
and intertemporal prospects based on similarity judgments and identify the intuition 
driving these predictions – an intuition referred to as the “nothing to gain / nothing to 
lose” effect.  Next, I propose a similarity-based procedure whereby individuals choose 
strategies in simple 2x2 games.  Strategy choices recommended by this procedure are 
sensitive to the relative magnitude of game payoffs.  In the context of games for 
which there are multiple equilibria, this procedure implies that for certain 
configurations of payoffs, players may perceive that there is “nothing to lose” by 
                                                 
2 Other work examining the role of similarity judgment in games is contained in Rubinstein (2004) and Zizzo 
(2002). 
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choosing the strategy corresponding to payoff dominance.  For other payoff 
configurations, there may appear to be “nothing to gain” by choosing that strategy in 
which case the strategy corresponding to security-mindedness will be selected. Should 
one player face a payoff configuration for which there appears to be “nothing to lose” 
by choosing the strategy corresponding to payoff dominance and the other player a 
configuration suggesting the security-minded strategy be selected, the model predicts 
that the result of the game will be one of the non-equilibrium outcomes.   
 In games involving pure conflict in which there are no pure strategy equilibria, 
the procedure implies that certain payoff configurations will, nonetheless, result in 
specific pure strategy outcomes predominating.  Finally, the procedure implies that 
theoretically inconsequential re-framing of games may influence subjects’ strategy 
choices and the resulting game outcomes. Data confirming all these predictions is 
presented. 
 
Similarity Judgments and the “Nothing to Gain / Nothing to Lose” Effect 
 Imagine giving people a choice between the lottery R:{ $10, .1, $0, .9 } and its 
expected value EV{R}= $1 and a choice between the lottery R:{ $10, .9, $0, .1 } and 
its expected value EV{R}= $9.  We would not be surprised if they chose the lottery in 
the first case but the expected value in the second.  Though plausible, this pair of 
choices is inconsistent with the standard assumption of risk aversion.  However, both 
choices follow in a straight-forward manner if people choose based upon similarity 
judgments along lines suggested by Rubinstein (1988, 2003) and Leland (1994, 1998, 
2001, 2002).3  To illustrate, suppose that between simple lotteries of the form,  
                                                 
3 Related work was done early on by Tversky (1969) and Montgomery (1983), and more recently by psychologists 
(e.g., Medin, Goldstone and Markman (1995), Markman and Medin (1995), Mellers and Biagini (1994) Gonzalez-
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R:{ $10, p, $0, 1-p }, and their corresponding expected values, S:{EV[R]}, agents 
recognize that there are circumstances, to occur with probability p, in which the 
lottery will yield $10 while the certain alternative yields EV{R} and other 
circumstances, occurring with probability 1-p, in which the lottery yields $0 while the 
alternative course of action again yields EV{R}.  If so, then we can think of agents as 
representing the choice as shown below. 
R:  {   $10  ,  p ;   $0  ,  1-p } 
S:    {   EV{R} ,           p ;    EV{R} , 1-p }
    
To choose between these alternatives assume agents compare prizes $10 and 
EV{R} and their associated probabilities of occurrence, p and p, and then the prizes 
$0 and EV{R} and their associated probabilities, 1-p and 1-p, where all comparisons 
concern whether the values appear similar or dissimilar.  For each pair of 
comparisons, agents decide whether the pair 1) “favor” one alternative over another 
(e.g., when one alternative offers a dissimilar and better prize at dissimilar and greater 
or similar probability), 2) are “inconclusive” (e.g., when one lottery offers a dissimilar 
and better prize but the other offers a good prize at dissimilar and greater probability ) 
or, 3) are “inconsequential” (e.g., when both lotteries offer similar prizes at similar 
probabilities).  Assume further that players choose one option over the other if it is 
favored in some comparisons and not disfavored in any and at random otherwise.4 For 
choices between R and S evaluated in this manner, when p is small and thus EV{R} 
close to $0, $1 for example, the risky alternative R will be preferred to the extent that 
if offers noticeably better prize (e.g., $10 versus $1) at similar, indeed identical, 
probability and a worst outcome $0 similar to EV{R}, again at similar (equal) 
                                                                                                                                            
Vallejo (2002)) as well as economists (e.g.,  Azipurtha et al (1993), Buchena and Zelberman (1995), and Loomes 
(2006)). 
 
4 See Leland (1994 and 1998) for an extended discussion as to when judgments of similarity and dissimilarity will 
recommend one option over another. 
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probability. In such cases, there appears to be “nothing to lose” by gambling. As p 
increases, we reach a point where either $10 appears dissimilar to EV{R} and EV{R} 
dissimilar to $0 or $10 similar to EV{R} and EV{R} similar to $0. In these cases, the 
comparisons are uninformative to the extent that either one favors R and one favors S 
or both are inconsequential.  For sufficient increases in p, however, the safe 
alternative S will be preferred to the extent that it offers a prize EV{R} that appears 
similar to the best possible outcome in R (e.g., $10 versus $9) at similar probability 
(the first paired comparison is “inconsequential”) and an outcome noticeably superior 
to the worst outcome in R (e.g., $9 versus $0) at similar probability – a comparison 
favoring S.  Here there appears to be “nothing to gain” by gambling.   
To summarize, let the binary relations >x and > p reading "greater than and 
dissimilar" be strict partial orders (asymmetric and transitive) on consequences and 
probabilities, respectively.  As such, the similarity relations, ~ x and ~p, defined by  > x 
and > p  are symmetric but not necessarily transitive in that for some prizes x f  >x g > 
x h,  x f ~ x x g, x g ~ x x h but x f > x x h with the same being possible for probabilities.  
Given this notation, for choices between a lottery and its expected value, as p 
increases, the predictions following from the “nothing to gain / nothing to lose” effect 
are as follows. 
Table 1 
$10 >
x
 EV{R}, 
EV{R} ~
x
 $0
$10 >
x
 EV{R},  EV{R}>
x
 $0,              
$10 ~
x
 EV{R}, EV{R} ~
x
 $0
$10 ~
x
 EV{R}, 
EV{R} >
x
 $0
R ? S
ntl ntg
Increasing p
 
 
 While extremely simple, maybe simple-minded, this type of reasoning about 
which components across alternative options appear similar and which appear 
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dissimilar enables us to explain the vast majority of instances in which people 
systematically violate the axioms of expected utility.   
 As but one example, consider the lotteries shown below: 
 S:{ 3000, .90 ; 0, .10 }   S':{  3000, .02 ; 0, .98 }   
 R:{ 6000, .45 ; 0, .55 }  R':{  6000, .01 ; 0, .99 } 
Given these choices people tend to choose S over R but R’ over S’.  This choice 
pattern constitutes what is known as the “common ratio” violation of the 
independence axiom. That the choices are inconsistent with independence follows 
from the fact that S’ and R’ are just 1/45th chances of S and R, respectively.   
To see how these choices are explained by similarity judgements, consider 
first the choice between S’ and R’.  Given these alternatives, agents first compare 
$3000 with $6000 and .02 with .01 and then compare $0 with itself and .98 with .99.  
In the first paired comparison assume that $6000 appears dissimilar and greater than 
$3000 and that .02 appears similar to .01.  If so, then the first paired comparison 
"favors" R' to the extent that it offers a noticeably better prize at similar probability. In 
the second paired comparison, the lotteries offer the same worst prize, $0, at similar 
probability, .99 ~p .98, in which case the comparison is deemed "inconsequential".  
Thus it appears there is “nothing to lose” by choosing the risky alternative to the 
extent it offers a noticeably better prize at similar probability and the same worst 
outcome at similar probability.  
Scaling lottery probabilities up while holding their ratio constant may 
eventually make them appear dissimilar.  If so, then in choosing between R and S 
agents will perceive $6000 >x $3000 and .90 >p .45 in which case the first paired 
comparison will be judged "inconclusive" - R offers a noticeably better prize but S 
offers a good prize at noticeably higher probability.  The second paired comparison 
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will, however, "favor" S as R offers a similar worst prize ($0 ~x $0) at noticeably 
higher probability (.55 >p .10).  As such, S will be selected as it is favored in at least 
one paired comparison and not disfavored in any others.  Thus, as the probabilities of 
the non-zero outcomes rise in common ratio type lotteries, the predictions that follow 
if people base their choices on similarity judgements can be summarized as follows. 
Table 2 
$6000 >
x
 3000, .02 ~
p
 .01      
$0 ~
x
 $0, .99 ~
p
 .98  
$6000 >
x
 3000, .90 >
p
 .45      
$0 ~
x
 $0, .10 >
p
 .55 
R S
ntl
Increasing p
 
 Identical logic allows us to explain anomalies in intertemporal choice.  
Consider, for example, the choices between intertemporal prospects 
S(maller)S(ooner)1 and L(arger)L(ater)2 and SS11 and LL12 below: 
SS1 :{ $20 , 1 week     }  SS11 :{ $20 , 11 weeks      } 
LL2:{ $25 , 2 weeks     }  LL12:{ $25 , 12  weeks     } 
Individuals indifferent between SS1 and LL2 tend to strictly prefer LL12 to SS11 
– a finding referred to as the “common difference” effect.  Given the choice between  
SS1 and LL2 , individuals perceiving $25 as dissimilar and greater than $20 and a 2 
week delay as dissimilar and worse than a 1 week delay, will conclude that the paired 
comparison is “inconclusive” and choose at random.  However, if deferring both 
payoffs a constant amount into the future makes the delays appear similar (i.e. 12 
weeks delay appears similar to 11 weeks delay), but $25 still appears dissimilar to 
$20, they will choose LL12  over  SS11  since there appears to be “nothing to lose” by 
waiting an additional week for a noticeably better payoff.5 Letting >t and ~ t denote 
                                                 
5 Leland (2001, 2002) contains a detailed discussion of the role of similarity judgments in intertemporal choice. 
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“dissimilar and greater” and “similar” time periods, respectively, these predictions can 
be summarized as follows: 
Table 3 
$25 >
x
 20, 2 >
t
 1    $25 >
x
 20, 12 ~
t
 11 
? LL
ntl
Increasing t
 
 
The Nothing to Gain / Nothing to Lose Effect and Behavior in Games 
 We are now in a position to consider what decisions based on similarity 
judgments might imply in the context of single-shot games.  For this purpose, 
consider the following generic 2x2 game. 
Figure 1 
L R
Player 1 U a, w b, x
D c, y d, z
 
 
Given such a game, suppose that the players reason as follows:   
1) Do I have a dominating strategy? For this purpose, assume Player 1 (2) 
first compares his payoffs a and c (w and x) under the assumption that the 
other player has chosen L (U) and then compares b and d (y and z) under 
the assumption that the other player has chosen R (D). 6  If a dominant 
strategy is identified, it is selected: otherwise, 
2) Do I have a dominating strategy given similar and dissimilar payoffs? For 
this purpose, Player 1 (with an analogous procedure for Player 2) again 
                                                 
6 You might think of the assumption that agents consider their own payoffs first as an assumption that we are 
dealing with the most basic, or maybe base, types of players in classification schemes discussed by Costa Gomes, 
Crawford and Broseta (2001) and Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004).We will explore the consequences of 
considering the other player’s payoff first later in the paper. 
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compares his payoffs a and c assuming Player 2 has chosen L and b and d 
assuming Player 2 has chosen R.  Here, however, if a and c and/or b and d 
appear similar, Player 1 deems that comparison “Inconsequential” and 
bases his decision only on the other payoff comparison or, if both are 
inconsequential, continues to Step 3.  If this process identifies a strategy 
which is dominant in similarity, it is selected: otherwise, 
3) Does the other player have a dominating strategy? Here the process in Step 
1 is repeated although now the players apply the reasoning to the other 
player’s payoffs.  If the player concludes that the other has a dominant 
strategy, he best responds to that strategy: otherwise, 
4) Does the other player have a dominating strategy given similar and 
dissimilar payoffs.  Here the process in Step 2 is repeated although now 
the players apply the reasoning to the other player’s payoffs.  If the player 
concludes that the other has a dominant strategy in similarity, he best 
responds to that strategy: otherwise, 
5) Employ some other criterion for deciding (e.g., choose at random.) 
 
The Role of Similarity Judgments in Coordination Games 
Now consider how this procedure would apply in the following generalized 
stag-hunt or assurance game shown in abstract form below where Player 1 has payoffs 
h(igh), m(edium) and l(ow), and Player 2 has payoffs t(op), c(enter) and b(ottom): 
 
Figure 2 
L R
Player 1 U h, t l, c
D m, b m, c
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In this game, there is no dominating strategy for Player 1 and, since the payoff 
ordering facing Player 2 is the same, no dominating strategy for Player 2. There are, 
however, two equilibria in pure strategies, UL and DR, as well as one mixed strategy.  
Both players would prefer the pareto optimal equilibrium UL to the pareto dominated 
one DR.  UL is, however, riskier in the sense that if either player plays the strategy 
corresponding to the pareto dominant equilibrium, and the other player fails to do so, 
the first player incurs a loss of l (b), whereas if players choose the strategies 
corresponding to the deficient equilibrium they are assured the intermediate payoff of 
m (c). Given this tension the question is, “Which of the pure strategy equilibria will 
players choose, if either?”  Three criteria have been widely proposed as means 
whereby agents decide in favor of one equilibrium over another.   
One criterion proposed in the literature is “payoff dominance.”  It requires that 
players choose the equilibrium offering all players their highest payoff.  By this 
criterion, row and column players should play U and L, respectively, and irrespective 
of the relative magnitudes of the payoffs – only the ordering of the payoffs matters. 
A second possibility is that people are security-minded and choose the strategy 
that minimizes the worst possible payoff they might get.  Players following this 
criterion will choose their maximin strategies resulting in the equilibrium DR.  Here 
again, only the relative magnitudes of the payoffs matter. 
A third criterion for equilibrium selection is “risk dominance.” A risk 
dominant equilibrium is one that jointly minimizes the losses incurred by players as a 
consequence of unilaterally deviating from their equilibrium strategy. The risk 
dominant strategy corresponds to the one that maximizes the Nash product of the 
players “own deviation” losses.  As such, in contrast to payoff dominance and 
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security-mindedness, the strategy recommended by risk dominance depends not only 
on the ordering of the payoffs but also their relative magnitude.   
As an empirical matter, none of these three selection criteria have proven very 
successful at explaining behavior observed in games involving multiple equilibria.7  
With this in mind, consider how an individual employing the process described in the 
prior section would play this type of game. Given that there are no dominating 
strategies in this game, players would proceed to the second step in the procedure and 
attempt to see whether there is a dominant alternative in similarity.  Given the payoffs 
compared by each player, players might maintain any of 5 possible configurations of 
similarity and dissimilarity perceptions.  The one where the best and worst outcome 
are similar is uninteresting and will henceforth be ignored.  The other four are shown 
along the left and upper borders in Table 4 ordered for values of the intermediate 
payoffs m and c varying from small to large.  
Table 4 
t >
x
 c, c ~
x
 b t >
x
 c, c >
x
 b,              
t ~
x
 c, c ~
x
 b
t ~
x
 c, c >
x
 b
h >
x
 m, m ~
x
 l UL UL UR
ntl, ntl ntl,  br ntl, ntg
Increasing 
m
h >
x
 m, m >
x
 l ,         
h ~
x
 m, m ~
x
 l UL ?? DR
br, ntl br, ntg
h ~
x
 m, m >
x
 l DL DR DR
ntg, ntl ntg, br ntg, ntg
Increasing c
 
 
The consequences of choosing based on similarity judgments are shown in the 
interior cells in the table.  To see how these predictions arise, assume to begin that 
                                                 
7 See Camerer (2003) and Haruvy and Stahl (2004) for summaries of the evidence. 
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Player 2 perceives t(op) as dissimilar to c(enter) and c as similar to b(ottom) (i.e., the 
cases in the first column of Table 1) as would be the case if the center prize was as 
close in value to the bottom prize as possible.  For this configuration of similarity 
perceptions, it will appear to Player 2 that there is “nothing to lose” by choosing L as 
it offers a noticeably better outcome than R, t versus c, in the first comparison made 
whereas R offers an outcome, c, similar to the worst outcome in L in the second 
comparison.  Should Player 1 also perceive his high payoff as dissimilar to the middle 
one and it as similar to the low one, he will likewise conclude there is “nothing to 
lose” by choosing strategy U offering the highest payoff.  In this case the payoff 
dominant equilibrium UL will be the outcome of the game. If, instead, Player 1 
perceived h >x m and m >x l or h ~x m and m ~x l, as will eventually occur if m is 
increased from its minimum value, the payoff comparisons are uninformative.  In this 
case, Player 1 proceeds to Steps 3 and 4, tries to infer what Player 2 is going to do 
given the payoffs Player 2 faces, and best responds to that expected choice.  Since, 
Player 2 doesn’t have a dominant strategy, Player 1 will attempt to infer whether he 
has a dominating strategy in similarity.  Assume here, and throughout the remainder 
of the paper, that players share perceptions as to when payoffs are similar or 
dissimilar.  If so, Player 1 will correctly anticipate that Player 2 is going to choose L 
and best respond by choosing U.  Once again, the payoff dominant equilibrium UL 
will be the outcome of the game.  For continued increases in m,  Player 1 will 
eventually perceive h(igh) as similar to m(edium) and m(edium) as dissimilar to  
l(ow), at which point he will feel there is “nothing to gain” by choosing the strategy 
corresponding to the payoff dominant equilibrium and play the security-minded 
strategy D instead.  Now the outcome of the game will be the non-equilibrium 
outcome DL.  Reasoning for increases in c and for m and c simultaneously follows the 
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same logic.  As indicated reading across the rows, down the columns and along the 
diagonal in the table, as the value of the intermediate payoff varies from low to high, 
players move from perceiving “nothing to lose” by choosing the higher payoff – 
higher variance option to perceiving that there is “nothing to gain” by doing so or, 
more formally: 
 
Prediction 1: Given a 2x2 stag-hunt game with payoffs as configured in Figure 2, 
strategy choice will shift from U (L) to D (R) as the value of the intermediate payoff 
m (c ) varies from its minimum to its maximum. 
 
 To test this prediction and its associated implications regarding which 
outcome of a game should predominate, 76 student subjects participated in an 
experiment conducted at the University of Trento in Italy. The experiment consisted 
of three parts. 8  In the first part, subjects played 9 games. In each game, subjects were 
randomly and anonymously matched with another participant in the experiment.  In 
each game, subjects either chose between playing U(p) or D(own) or between L(eft) 
and (Right).  All questions were presented in the format shown below. 
If Other chooses L and you choose U You receive 8.00 and Other receives 8.00
D 5.00 2.00
If Other chooses R and you choose U You receive 2.00 and Other receives 5.00
D 5.00 5.00  
 
Five of the questions were generalized stag-hunt games.  Three were a generalized 
form of the matching pennies game.  A final game, also a stag-hunt, tested whether 
play is subject to framing effects. The order of the first eight games was randomized 
                                                 
8 The second and third sets of questions presented to subjects involved binary choices between intertemporal and 
risky prospects, respectively. 
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subject to the constraint that a game of one type was never followed by a game of the 
identical type. The game testing for framing effects was always played last as it 
involved a change in instructions. Payoffs corresponding to the U or D and L or R 
label in each game also alternated at random.  Subjects were told before the beginning 
of the experiment that at the end of the experimental session, one of the games would 
be selected at random and they would receive the payoff for that game resulting from 
their strategy choice and that of the individual with whom they were paired.  Possible 
payoffs from this game ranged from 1.20 to 8 euro. 
 The five stag-hunt games are shown in Table 5.  The upper matrix shows the 
payoff values for each game and the lower matrix the experimental results and 
equilibrium frequencies predicted based on players’ responses. 
  
Table 5 
L R
Player 1 U 8.00, 8.00 2.00, 2.10
D 2.10, 2.00 2.10, 2.10
L R
Player 1 U 8.00,  8.00 2.00, 5.00
D 5.00, 2.00 5.00, 5.00
Player 2
Player 1 L R L R L R
U 8.00, 8.00 2.00, 2.10 U 8.00, 8.00 2.00, 5,00 Player 1 U 8.00,  8.00 2.00,  7.90
D 7.90, 2.00 7.90, 2.10 D 7,90, 2.00 7,90, 5.00 D 7.90, 2.00 7.90, 7.90
L R
Player 1 U 95% 3% 37 (97%)
D 3% 0% 1 (3%)
37 (97%) 1 (3%)
L R
Player 1 U 32% 15% 18 (47%)
D 36% 17% 20 (53%)
26 (68%) 12 (32%)
Player 2
Player 1 L R L R L R
U 41% 4% 17 (45%) U 15% 14% 11 (29%) Player 1 U 13% 24% 14 (37%)
D 51% 4% 21 (55%) D 37% 34% 27 (71%) D 22% 42% 24 (63%)
35 (92%) 3 (8%) 20(53%) 18 (47%) 13 (34%) 25 (66%)
III-I III-II III-III
Player 2 Player 2
I-I
Player 2
II-II
Increase 
m
Player 2
III-III
Player 2 Player 2
Increasing c
Increase 
m
Player 2
III-I III-II
Player 2
II-I II-II II-III
I-I I-II I-III
Increasing c
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In game I-I, m and c are set at minimum values of 2.1. This results in 97% of Player 
1s playing U, 97% of Player 2s playing L, and the predominant predicted game 
outcome being UL (95%).  In game III-I, the value of m is increased to 7.9.  
Consistent with Prediction 1, this increases the frequency with which Player 1s 
choose D from 3% to 55% (McNemar’s χ21df = 16.4091, p=.0001), leaves the 
frequency with which Player 2s choose L (97% versus 92%) statistically unaffected 
(McNemar’s χ2 =.50, p= .4795 ), and results in the non-equilibrium outcome DL 
predominating at a predicted 51%.  
Increasing m from 5 to 7.9 holding c fixed at 5 (i.e., moving from game II-II to 
game III-II) has a similar effect – the frequency with which Player 1s choose D 
increases significantly from 53% to 71% (McNemar’s χ21df = 4 , p=.0455) while the 
frequency with which Player 2s choose L (68% versus 53%) is statistically unaffected 
(McNemar’s χ2 = 2.083, p = .1489).  
Returning to game III-I in which m is at its maximum of 7.9 and c at its 
minimum value of 2.1,  if we now increase c to 5 (Game III-II) and then to 7.9 (game 
III-III) the frequency with which Player 2 chooses the security-minded strategy R 
rises from 8% to 47% to 66% as per Prediction 1. A Cochrane test evaluating 
differences among related proportions for Player 2 is significant (χ22df = 29.1538, p= 
.0000).  The difference in proportion between games III-I and III-II is significant 
(McNemar’s χ2 = 10.3158, p=.0013) while the difference between proportions in 
games III-II and III-III is just shy of significance (McNemar’s χ21df =3.2727, p = 
.0704).  The proportions of Player 1s choosing D across these three games (55%, 71% 
and 63%) differ insignificantly ((χ22df = 3.85714, p=.145356) as is to be expected 
given the payoffs facing Player 1s didn’t change across these three games. Also as 
anticipated, the predominant outcome of the game predicted based on players’ 
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strategy choices shifts away from the non-equilibrium outcome DL toward the 
equilibrium DR as c rises.  Specifically, while in game III-I there are 51% DL 
outcomes implied by the Player 1 and Player 2 responses and only 4% DR outcomes 
implied, when c takes on the intermediate value of 5, the implied percentage of DL 
outcomes falls to 37% while the expected DR percentage rises to 34%.  For c equal to 
7.9 the results are even more extreme with the percentage of DL outcomes implied by 
subjects’ responses falling to 22% while the expected DR percentage rises to 42%.    
Games I-I, II-II and III-III examine the effects of simultaneously increasing 
both m and c from 2.1 to 5 to 7.9.  Once again, the proportion of D (R) choices 
increases systematically from 3% to 53% to 63% for Player 1 (and 3% to 32% to 66% 
for Player 2.) A Cochrane test evaluating differences among related proportions for 
Player 1s and Player 2s combined as the game is symmetric is significant (χ22df = 
66.63, p= .0000 ) as are tests for the difference in proportion between games I-I and 
II-II (McNemar’s χ21df =28.13, p= .0000 ) and  between games II-II and III-III 
(McNemar’s χ21df =12.57, p = .0004). Also as anticipated, the predominant outcome 
of the game predicted based on players’ strategy choices shifts away from the payoff 
dominant equilibrium, UL, (from 95% to 32% to 13%) and toward the security-
minded one, DR (from 0% to 17% to 42%) as m and c rise.   
 Table 6 summarizes how these results square with the predictions of the 
equilibrium selection criteria discussed earlier as well as with the hypothesis that 
subjects are playing their Nash mixed strategies where, for clarity, we consider only 
Games I-I, III-I and III-III for which the “nothing to gain / nothing to lose” effect 
predictions are strict.   
Table 6 
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Game I-I III-I III-III
Predominant Eq. Predicted Based on 
Player' Responses UL (95%) DL (51%) DR (42%)
Equilibrium Selection Criterion
Mixed Strategies DR 25% each UL
Payoff Dominance UL UL UL
Security-mindedness DR DR DR
Risk Dominance UL UL or DR DR
ntg/ntl UL DL DR  
 
As indicated in the table, the predictions that follow from the hypothesis that players 
are employing Nash mixed strategies are exactly wrong.  Of the selection criteria, 
payoff dominance predicts the choice of UL in all three games independent of the 
values of m and c while security-mindedness predicts DR in all three.  As a 
consequence, these selection criteria only predict the predominant outcome in one of 
the games correctly. Risk dominance performs best, correctly predicting the 
predominant outcomes in games I-I and III-III. It cannot, however, account for the 
behavior observed in game III-I.9   
 Results similar to the ones reported above have been reported elsewhere in the 
literature.  Rydval and Ortmann (2004), for example, report that in the game shown 
below on the left, 79% of subjects choose the strategy U, corresponding to payoff 
dominance, whereas in the game on the right only 44% do.  
L R L R
Player 1 U (79%) 80, 80 10, 30 Player 1 U (44%) 80, 80 10, 50
D 30, 10 30, 30 D 50, 10 50,50
Player 2 Player 2
 
 
The difference between the game on the left and the one on the right is that the m=c 
payoff is increased from 30 to 50.  According to Prediction 1, this should make 
                                                 
9 Moreover, when it works the reason is clear. When risk dominance predicts the payoff dominant equilibrium UL 
(in Game I-I) it is because the differences between the payoffs contributing to “nothing to lose” reasoning, h-m and 
t-c, are large so the Nash product associated with UL is large.  Likewise, when it predicts the security-minded 
equilibrium DR, it is because differences between payoffs contributing to the  perception that there is “nothing to 
gain,” m-l and c-b, are large so the Nash product of DR is large.   
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strategies associated with the payoff dominant equilibrium UL less attractive (since 
there appears to be “nothing to gain” by choosing U and L if 80 ~x 50) and those 
associated with the security-minded equilibrium DR more attractive (since there 
appears to be “something to lose” by not choosing D and R if 50 >x 10.)  
 Rydval and Ortmann (2005) interpret their findings as indicating the 
superiority of risk dominance over payoff dominance as a selection criterion. 
However, other results argue against this interpretation in favor of the hypothesis that 
behavior is being generated by the “nothing to gain / nothing to lose” effect.  To 
illustrate, consider the following games discussed by Keser and Vogt (2000).  
L R L R
U 70, 70 20, 5
28/48    
(58%) U 140, 140 20, 5
35/36 
(97%)
D 5, 20 50, 50 D 5, 20 50, 50
Player 2 Player 2
Player 1 Player 1
 
 
Note that DR is the security-minded equilibrium in both these games whereas UL is 
payoff and risk dominant in both.  The latter fact notwithstanding, in the game on the 
left, nearly half of subjects fail to choose according to risk dominance. Indeed, given 
the near 50:50 split in the first game, none of the three commonly proposed selection 
principles explain play here.  If players perceive 70 as dissimilar and greater than 5 
but also 50 as dissimilar and greater than 20, the approximate 50:50 split would be 
what we would expect if subjects were employing similarity judgments to make their 
strategy choices. 10 
In the game on the right, the “h” and “t” payoffs of 70 have been increased to 
140.  While 50 may appear dissimilar to 20 in the context of payoffs of 70 and 5, if it 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, a slight majority of subjects (28/48) favor U.  This is as it should be if people are choosing based 
on similarity as D cannot be recommended based on similarity judgments. For this to occur, 70 would have to 
appear similar to 5 but then 50 and 20 must be similar too at which point the choice is resolved at random.  On the 
other hand, U can be recommended if 70 >x 5 and 50 ~x 20. 
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appears similar to 20 in the presence of a much larger number, 140,  there will appear 
to be “nothing to lose” by choosing the strategies corresponding to the payoff 
dominant equilibrium.11  That this strategy also happens to be the risk dominant one is 
an artifact. 
Similarity Judgments in Games of Pure Conflict 
The evidence presented above supports the hypothesis that people are basing their 
choices of strategies in simple 2x2 single-shot games on similarity judgments and not 
on some equilibrium selection principle nor randomization.  To further substantiate 
this claim, we now consider the implications of similarity judgments in situations 
where randomization is the only solution proffered by game theory; namely, in games 
of pure conflict. To begin, consider the following hybrid matching game.   
Figure 3 
L R
Player 1 U h, b m, t
D l, c h, b
Player 2
 
This game is a generalization of the matching pennies games.  Player 1 prefers 
outcomes UL and DR and Player 2 prefers DL and UR. There are no pure strategy 
equilibria in this game, only a mixed strategy with the optimal probabilities varying 
with the payoff values.  A Player 1 employing the decision process proposed in this 
paper will compare the best and worst outcomes, h and l, and compare the best and 
intermediate ones, h and m. When both comparisons involve dissimilar payoffs, the 
comparison of the best and worst favors U whereas the comparison of the best and 
intermediate favors D.  As the middle payoff, m, is increased to its maximum, it will 
be perceived as similar to the best outcome, h, at which point the player will choose U 
                                                 
11 Keser and Vogt (2000) explain their findings in terms of a principle termed “modified risk dominance” 
proposed by Vogt and Albers (1997) in which the choice of strategies is based on perceived rather than actual 
payoffs.  Perceived payoffs are derived from a theory of “prominent numbers.”  
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since there will be “nothing to gain” by choosing the higher variance (although in this 
game not a higher payoff) strategy D. Notice that given this game configuration, there 
is no “nothing to lose” effect for Player 1 for the simple reason that the middle payoff 
is never compared to the worst one.  As such, for m not similar to h, Player 1 will 
either best respond to Player 2 or choose at random.  For reasons to become clear 
momentarily, Player 2 will only systematically choose his strategy R, for which 
Player 1’s best response is D.  Taken together, these observations suggest: 
 
Prediction 2: Given a 2x2 conflict game with payoffs as configured in Figure 3, with 
m at a minimum, strategy choice will shift from random choice to U as the value of 
the intermediate payoff m rises.  
 
A Player 2 employing the decision process proposed here will also compare 
his best and worst outcomes, t and b, but will compare the intermediate with the 
worst, c and b, rather than the intermediate with the best. As a consequence, decreases 
in c will result in a “nothing to lose” effect and the choice of R.  However, increases 
in c will not prompt a “nothing to gain” response as this requires t ~x c, but given the 
payoff structure in Figure 3, these payoffs are never compared.  Instead, for high 
values of c, Player 2 will either choose at random or best respond to Player 1.  We 
know from the prior paragraph that the only systematic response from Player 1 will be 
U, in which case Player 2 will choose R.  Taken together, these observations imply: 
 
Prediction 3: Given a 2x2 conflict game with payoffs as configured in Figure 3, with c 
at a maximum, strategy choice will shift from random choice to L as the value of the 
intermediate payoff c falls.    
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The consequence of variations in the values of m and c for what outcome will obtain 
in the game are shown in Table 7.  In the upper-right hand cell, where m is as small as 
possible and c as large as possible, similarity considerations will not recommend a 
choice to either Player 1 nor Player 2 as indicated by the notation “??”.   
Table 7 
t >
x
 b,  c ~
x
 b t >
x
 b , c >
x
 b
h >
x
 l, h >
x
 m DR ??
Increasing 
m
br, ntl
h >
x
 l, h ~
x
 m UR UR
ntg, ntl ntg, br
Increasing c
 
Decreasing c produces the choice of R on the part of Player 2 as there appears to be 
“nothing to lose” by choosing this strategy.  Player 1 best responds to this choice by 
selecting D producing the outcome DR.  If we now increase m, Player 2s behaviour 
remains unchanged but Player 1 switches from choosing D to choosing the “nothing 
to gain” option U.   
 To test these predictions and compare them with those that would follow if 
agents optimally randomized their choices, subjects were given the three 
instantiations of the hybrid matching game shown in Table 8. The value of m 
increases from 3.6 in (G)ame IV-III to 5 in G V-II to 7.49 in G VI-I while value of c 
decreases from 7.4 to 5 to 3.51.  
Table 8 
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L R L R L R
Player 1 U 7,5, 3,5 3,6, 7,5 Player 1 U 7,5, 3.5 5, 7,5 Player 1 U 7,5, 3,5 7,49, 7,5
D 3,5, 7,4 7,5, 3,5 D 3,5, 5 7,5, 3,5 D 3,5, 3,51 7,5, 3,5
m
c
L R L R L R
Player 1 U 13% 50% 24 (63%) Player 1 U 47% 42% 34 (89%) Player 1 U 5% 90% 36 (95%)
D 8% 29% 14 (37%) D 6% 5% 4 (11%) D 0% 5% 2  (5%)
8 (21%) 30 (79%) 20 (53%) 18 (47%) 2  (5%) 36 (95%)
L R L R L R
Player 1 U 24% 25% 49% Player 1 U 10% 17% 27% Player 1 U 0% 0% 0%
D 25% 26% 51% D 28% 45% 73% D 0% 100% 100%
49% 51% 38% 62% 0% 100%
IV-III V-II VI-I
Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
3.6 5 7.49
7.4 5 3.51
Results and Implied Outcome Frequencies
Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
Mixed Strategy Probabilities and Implied Outcome Frequencies
Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
 
The matrices under the title “Results and Implied Outcome Frequencies” 
summarize the experimental findings. The number and percentage of players choosing 
U or D are shown to the right of each game, the number and percentage of players 
choosing L or R are shown below each game, and the implied frequencies with which 
each game outcome should occur given subjects’ choices are contained in the cells of 
each matrix.  Consistent with prediction 2, the frequency with which Player 1s choose 
U increases from 63% to 89% to 95% as m increases.  A Cochrane test suggests these 
differences are significant (χ22df =14.58824, p=.0007). A McNemar test of the 
difference in proportions between games IV-III and V-II is significant (χ21df = 5.7857, 
p=.0162) but the difference in proportions between  V-II and  VI-I is not (χ21df 
=.1667, p=.6831.) Note also that the increasing pattern of U choices as m rises is  
exactly opposite the pattern we would expect if subjects were playing optimal mixed 
strategies since, if they did, the frequency with which U is played should decline with 
m (from 49% to 27% to 0%) as indicated in the matrices under the title “Mixed 
Strategy Probabilities and Implied Outcome Frequencies “ in Table 8. 
Results regarding Prediction 3 are less clear.  As c decreases, the frequency 
with which R is selected unexpectedly declines from 79% in game IV-III to 47% in 
game V-II and then increases as expected to 95% in game VI-I. A Cochrane test for 
the difference between these three proportions is significant (χ22df =22.9090, 
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p=.0000).  Differences in the frequency with which R is selected are significant and in 
the predicted direction between games IV-III and VI-I (χ21df =4.1667, p=.0412) and 
between V-II and VI-I (χ21df =14.45, p=.0001) but inexplicably also different and in 
the wrong direction between IV-III and V-II (χ21df = 6.7222, p=.0095).  The behaviour 
of Player 2s’ is equally consistent or inconsistent with the hypothesis that subjects are 
playing optimal mixed strategies since if they were, the frequency with which R is 
played should systematically increase (from 51% to 62% to 1000%) as we move from 
game IV-III to V-II to VI-I. 
As was the case with coordination games, the model of game play based on 
similarity judgments enables us to understand other evidence contradicting the 
predictions of game theory in the context of games of pure conflict.  To demonstrate, 
consider the following three pure matching games discussed by Goeree and Holt 
(2005).  In these pure matching games, there are no equilibria in pure strategies – 
Player 1’s interests are exactly the opposite of Player 2’s. A second thing to note 
about this specific type of matching game is that the mixed strategy equilibrium has 
both players randomizing 50:50 independent of the values of the payoffs.  Consistent 
with this requirement, Goeree and Holt (2005), report that subjects playing the game 
on the left once, play the two available strategies (U or D and L or R) very close to 
50% of the time.   
L R L R L R 
U 80, 40 40, 80 48% U 44, 40 40, 80 8% U 320, 40 40, 80 96%
D 40, 80 80, 40 D 40, 80 80, 40 D 40, 80 80, 40
48% 80% 16%
Player 2
Player 1
Player 2
Player 1
Player 2
Player 1
 
However, such is not the case for the games in the middle and to the right. Instead, 
virtually all Player 1s play D in the game in the center and U in the one on the right 
while a large percentage of Player 2s play L in the middle game and R in the one on 
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the right. This is what we would expect if subjects choose according to similarity.  
Players will choose at random in the game on the left if 80 >x 40. The game in the 
center is obtained from the game on the left by reducing the prize of 80 to Player 1, 
conditional on Player 2 choosing L, to 44. Assuming that this manipulation produces 
the perception that 44~x 40, 80 >x 44, it will now appear to Player 1 that there is 
“nothing to lose” by choosing strategy D which offers a prize noticeably better than 
the rest.  Player B has no dominating strategy in similarity to the extent  80 >x 40 but 
reasons that Player 1 does have one, namely D, and best responds with R.  Thus we 
expect the outcome DR to predominate.  
 In the game on the right, Player 1s U payoff, conditional on Player 2 choosing 
left, is increased from 80 to 320.  To the extent that this replacement makes the 
previously dissimilar prizes (80 >x 40) appear similar (i.e., 320 >x 80, 80 ~x 40), there 
will appear to be “nothing to lose” by choosing strategy U offering the noticeably 
higher payoff. Player 2, reasoning about his own payoffs will conclude that he has 
neither a dominating strategy nor a dominating strategy in similarities.  As such, he 
will consider Player 1’s situation.  If Player 2 concludes Player 1 has a dominating 
strategy in similarities (i.e., he believes that Player 1 perceives 320 >x 80 ~x 40) 
Player 2 will choose the best response and play R.  Thus we expect the outcome UR 
to predominate. 
 
Similarity Judgments and Iterated Dominance Games 
In addition to enabling us to understand why equilibrium selection criteria fail 
and why certain game outcomes may predominate even in games without pure 
strategy equilibria, the model presented here enables us to understand certain failures 
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of iterated dominance in extensive form games.  Beard and Beil (1994) report results 
for the following sequential game shown in extensive and normal form. 
m, b
L R
Up U m, b m, b
D l, c h, t
Player 1
Down
l, c h, t
Left Player 2 Right
Player 2
Player 1
 
 
  In the game, Player 1 has the opportunity to play either U(p), in which case the game 
ends and players receive payoffs m and b, respectively, or D(own) in which case 
Player 2 then chooses between strategies Left and Right.  If Player 2 chooses Left, 
Player 1 receives his worst outcome, l, and Player 2 his intermediate payoff, c.  If 
Player 2 plays Right, both receive their most preferred payoffs, h and t, respectively.  
By backward induction, Player 1 should predict that Player 2 will choose R if given 
the opportunity to do so since the top prize is preferred to the center one.  Given this, 
Player 1 should choose D(own) since the high prize he will get when Player 2 chooses 
R is preferred to the middle one Player 1 gets if he opts out and chooses U(p). This 
prediction depends only on the ordinal ranking of the payoffs and not on their relative 
size.  However, Beard and Beil found that Player 1s, given the three games shown 
below, systematically shifted away from choosing D(own) and passing the decision to 
Player 2 toward choosing U instead as the value of m increased.   
L R L R L R
U 7, 3 7, 3 20% U 9, 3 9, 3 65% U 9.75, 3 9.75, 3 66%
D 3, 4,75 10, 5 80% D 3, 4,75 10, 5 35% D 3, 4,75 10, 5 34%
m = 7 9 9.75
Player 2 Player 2 Player 2
Player 1 Player 1 Player 1
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This is what we expect given the decision process proposed.  In all three of these 
games, R is a dominating strategy for Player 2. Given our model assumes players first 
look to see whether they have a dominating strategy, we would predict Player 2 would 
consistently choose R.  Whether Player 1 best responds to the fact that Player 2 has a 
dominating strategy depends on whether he ever checks to see whether this is the case 
which, in turn, depends upon whether he perceives his own payoffs m and l and 
payoffs h and m as similar or dissimilar.  In the game above on the left, this involves 
comparing 7 and 3 and 10 and 7.  To the extent that all these values appear dissimilar, 
he will then compare Player 2s’ top payoff of 5 with the center one, 4.75, and the 
bottom one with itself, conclude Player 2 is going to choose R and best respond with 
Down.  This is what 80% of Beard and Beil’s Player 1s did.  However, increasing the 
m payoff (to 9 in the game in the center and 9.75 in the game on the right) increases 
the likelihood that Player 1 will perceive m >x l and h ~x m at which point he will 
conclude there is  “nothing to gain” by choosing strategy D.  Consistent with this 
prediction, the percent of subjects choosing  D declines to 35% and then to 34% as m 
rises.   
The model presented here cannot provide a full account of Beard and Beil’s 
findings.  To illustrate, consider the following game. 
  Player 2  
  L R  
U 9.75, 3 9.75, 3 47% Player 1 
D 3, 3 10, 5 53% 
 
This game is identical to the one above on the right except that the b(ottom) payoff to 
Player 2 has been decreased from 4.75 to 3.  This should have had no effect on Player 
1s willingness to play D and let Player 2 choose a strategy since, if as assumed in the 
game above on the right, m >x l and h ~x m, Player 1 would have never considered 
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what Player 2 was going to do.  This result suggests that the comparisons players 
actually make are rather more comprehensive than modeled here.12 
 
Similarity Judgments, Quantal Response Equilibrium and Framing Effects in 
Games 
The intuition summarized in the “nothing to gain / nothing to lose” effect grew 
out of a model of “approximate expected utility maximization” I developed to explain 
observed violations of expected utility in Leland (1986). In that model, I assumed that 
expected utility maximizers were unable or unwilling to discriminate between prize 
values and probability values that were “close” in value, although they allocated an 
endowment of discriminatory ability to allow them to optimally discriminate.  The 
model did a reasonably good job of explaining the anomalies we were aware of at the 
time and had certain nice properties: the assumption of limited discriminatory ability 
seemed relatively uncontroversial, agents responded optimally given this constraint 
and the model converged to  standard expected utility in the limit as discrimination 
improved.   
In several recent papers, Goeree and Holt (2004) and Goeree, Holt and Palfrey 
(2005) have taken a similar approach to explain the types of misbehavior in games 
discussed here and elsewhere (see particularly, Goeree and Holt, 2001).  The 
approach is based on McKelvey and Palfrey’s (1995) idea of a “quantal response 
equilibrium,” in which players do not chose the strategy with the highest payoff in a 
game with probability 1 but instead choose strategies with higher payoffs more 
frequently with the frequency increasing in the payoff difference between better and 
worse strategies.  The failure to completely respond to payoff differences is attributed 
                                                 
12 Goeree and Holt (2005) present a similar set of results involving a game of incredible threats.  As with the 
Beard and Beil study, the model presented here can explain some though not all their findings. 
 
 28 
to “noisy introspection,” a possible source of which is imprecision in the way payoffs 
are perceived.13  They go on to show that the choices of players who stochastically 
“better” respond in this fashion, rather than “best” respond, will be sensitive to payoff 
differences between strategies in ways observed in experiments.  This model, like my 
model of “approximate expected utility,” has nice properties: the assumption of 
“noisy introspect,” be it due to limited discriminatory ability or other causes, seems 
uncontroversial, agents respond optimally given this constraint, and  the model 
converges to  the rational model, in this case Nash equilibrium, as discrimination 
improves. To the extent that such a modelling approach can capture the same range of 
behaviours implied by the admittedly laborious and inelegant process of trying to 
understand behavior as the product of similarity judgements, there would be little 
reason to trouble with the latter.  Unfortunately, this doesn’t appear to be the case.   
To demonstrate, it is worth noting that while many of the predictions that 
follow if people base their choices on similarity judgments result from the 
intransitivity of the similarity relation, other predictions result from the framing of 
decisions. Framing influences similarity based choices through its influence on what 
is compared with what across alternatives.  To illustrate, consider choices between 
Envelope A1 and Envelope B1 and between Envelope A2 and Envelope B2 shown 
below where the prize awarded in each lottery depends on the number (between 1 and 
100) drawn from that envelope where each envelope contains 100 tickets numbered 1 
through 100.  
                                                 
13 Palfrey (2005) mentions this possibility explicitly.   
 
 29 
1 to 20 21 to 40 41 to 80 81 to 100
Envelope A1 $5 $5 $0 $13
Envelope B1 $5 $5 $0 $12
1 to 20 21 to 40 41 to 80 81 to 100
Envelope A2 $0 $13 $5 $0
Envelope B2 $5 $5 $0 $12
A2 B2
A1 25 (51%) 17 (35%) 42 (86%)
B1 5 (10%) 2 (4%) 7 (14%)
30 (61%) 19 (39%)   
In the choice between A1 and B1, it is clear that the former stochastically dominates 
the latter – a fact 86% of the Carnegie Mellon undergraduates given this question 
realized.  Choice A2B2 is probabilistically identical to A1B1, but here the dominance 
relationship has been obscured.  Individuals choosing based on similarity will choose 
B2 if they perceive 13 ~x 5, 5 ~x 0 but 12 >x 0.  Consistent with this prediction, 39% 
of the same subjects chose the dominated alternative B2 here.  To the extent that the 
choice pattern A1B2 occurs much more frequently than the other irrational patterns 
(35% versus 10% and 4%) and, indeed, occurs almost as frequently as the rational 
pattern A1B1 (35% vs. 51%), this result cannot possibly be attributed to random error. 
Moreover, this pattern of choices simply cannot be explain by expectation based 
models of choice – not even ones like prospect theory that make no claim of 
normative status even in some limit. 
To see how framing might influence behavior in games, note that in 
generating predictions to this point we have assumed that players focused first of the 
dissimilarity or similarity of their own payoffs given the other player’s choice of 
strategy (Steps 1 and 2 in the decision process presented earlier) and only considered 
the other player’s payoffs if the initial round of “own” payoff comparisons proved 
uninformative (in steps 3 and 4.) Suppose instead, that agents first attempt to best 
respond to what they anticipate the other player will do given the similarities and 
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dissimilarities in the other player’s payoffs (i.e., assume players implement Steps 3 
and 4 in the decision process first) and only consider the similarity of their own 
payoffs (i.e., implement Steps 1 and 2) if this proves uninformative. 
Given this sequence of evaluations and responses, outcomes of the generalized 
stag-hunt discussed earlier will vary as the value of the intermediate payoffs, m and c, 
increase in value as shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 
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x
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 b,              
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t ~
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 l UL UL UL
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m
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x
 m, m >
x
 l ,         
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x
 m, m ~
x
 l UL ?? DR
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h ~
x
 m, m >
x
 l UR DR DR
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Increasing c
 
Beginning in the upper left hand cell, Player 2, perceiving Player 1’s high payoff as 
dissimilar to the middle one and the middle as similar to the worst, will predict that 
Player 1 will choose U.  In this case, Player 2 will best respond by choosing L 
independent of what he perceives regarding his own payoffs (i.e., P2 will best respond 
with L for all cells in the top row of Table 9.)  Player 1, viewing Player 2’s top prize 
as dissimilar to the center one and the center as similar to the bottom, will expect 
Player 2 to choose L and best responds with U, once again independent of the 
similarities or dissimilarities among his own payoffs (i.e., in each cell in the first 
column of table 9.)  Predictions for the remaining cells are obtained in the same 
fashion.  
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 The predictions that follow if agents consider the similarities and 
dissimilarities of the other player’s payoffs first, summarized in table 9, are identical 
to those that follow if players consider their own payoffs first, summarized in Table 4, 
with two critical exceptions – the predicted responses in the southwest and northeast 
cells in the tables.  These cases correspond to situations in which the configurations of 
similarities and dissimilarities suggest that one player has “nothing to gain” by 
choosing the strategy offering the best possible outcome and the other has “nothing to 
lose” by doing so as was the case in Game III-I discussed earlier and reproduced 
below. 
L R
Player 1 U 8.00, 8.00 2.00, 2.10
D 7,90, 2.00 7,90, 2.10
III-I
Player 2
 
Recall that in this game, the intermediate value payoff, m, to Player 1 is made 
large, while the intermediate payoff, c, is made small.  The first manipulation 
promotes the perception of h ~x m and m>x l in which case there appears to be 
“nothing to gain” by choosing strategy D offering the highest payoff. The second 
manipulation promotes the perception of t >x c but c ~x b in which case there is 
“nothing to lose” by choosing the highest payoff option L.  Given these predictions 
we expected the non-equilibrium outcome DL to predominate in the game – and it 
did.   
But now think what happens when the opponent’s payoffs are considered first.  
In this case, Player 1 will conclude that Player 2 is going to choose L and best 
responds by choosing U.  Player 2 will conclude that Player 1 is going to choose D 
and best respond with R.  Together, these decisions produce the mirror image non-
equilibrium outcome UR.  
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This analysis suggests that, if subjects are really employing similarity 
judgments to make their strategy choices and if we can frame the game in such a way 
as to prompt subjects to consider the other player’s payoffs first, we will reverse their 
strategy choices and obtain the alternative non-equilibrium outcome. 
To test this prediction, subjects were presented with the following game:   
If Other chooses L and you choose U You receive 7.20 and Other receives 7.20
D 7.10 1.20
If Other chooses R and you choose U You receive 1.20 and Other receives 1.30
D 7.10 1.30
Given the payoffs Other faces, what choice do you predict he or she will make? L_____ or  R_____
Please indicate which choice you would like to make. U_____ or  D_____  
This question, denoted III-I*, was always the last game posed to subjects.  The game 
itself is derived by subtracting .80 from each of the payoffs in Game III-I. It also 
differs from Game III-I in that here subjects were explicitly asked to first predict what 
strategy the other player is going to choose and then what strategy they wish to 
choose – this is the re-framing intended to produce the strategy reversals. As indicated 
in Table 10 neither difference has any influence on the predictions of the equilibria 
selection criteria discussed early nor do they change the optimal mixed strategies for 
the game – all predictions are identical to those for Game III-I. Moreover, without 
some sort of ancillary theory of how the noise in introspection varies with the way the 
problem is posed, no change in behavior would be predicted by a quantal response 
model. 
Table 10 
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L R L R
Player 1 U 8.00, 8.00 2.00, 2.10 Player 1 U 7,20, 7,20 1,20, 1,20
D 7.90, 2.00 7.90, 2.10 D 7,10, 1,20 7,10, 1,30
m=c=
Payoff 
Dominant 
Eq. UL UL
Security-
minded 
eq. DR DR
Risk 
dominant 
eq. Neither Neither
Mixed 
strategy 
eq.
DL 
p(U)=.0167, 
p(L)=.9833
DL 
p(U)=.0167, 
p(L)=.9833
ntg/ntl 
outcome DL UR
L R L R
Player 1 U 41% 4% 17 (45%) Player 1 U 54% 25% 30 (79%)
D 51% 4% 21 (55%) D 5% 3% 8 (21%)
35 (92%) 3 (8%) 26 (68%) 12 (32%)
U9 D9 L9 R9
U4 36% 9% 17 (45%) L4 63% 29% 35 (92%)
D4 43% 12% 21 (55%) D9 5% 3% 3 (8%)
30 (79%) 8 (21%) 26 (68%) 12 (32%)
III-I III-I*
Player 2 Player 2
m=7,9, c=2,1 m=7,1, c=1,2
Responses and Implied Outcome Frequencies
III-I III-I*
Player 2 Player 2
Player 2 Player 2
III-I III-I*
 
 
 
 
Results are shown in Table 10.  Consistent with the predictions that follow if subjects 
choose strategies based on similarity judgments and if the framing manipulation 
employed succeeded, the proportion of Player 1s choosing U in III-I* (79%) is 
significantly larger than the percentage of Player 1s choosing U in III-I (45%) (χ21df 
=6.8571, p=.0088) and the proportion of Player 2s choosing R in III-I* (32%) is 
significantly larger than the percentage of Player 2s choosing R in III-I (8%) (χ21df = 
5.8182, p=.0159).  
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To close it is worth noting that the data on play in games III-I and III-I*, 
though largely consistent with the predictions following from the hypothesis that 
people base their choices on similarity judgments, also suggest that the framing 
manipulation employed in game III-I* was not entirely successful.  In particular, note 
that while the non-equilibrium outcome DL expected to predominate in game III-I 
does predominate (51%) the predominant pattern in III-I* is UL (54%) and not UR 
(25%) as expected.  The responses for Player 1s and Player 2s conditional on what 
they expected the other player to do, shown in Table 11, suggest why this is the case.   
Table 11 
L R U D
Player 1s U 30 (79%) 0 Player 2s L 16 (42%) 10 (26%)
Choice D 8 (21%) 0 Choice R 1 (3%) 11 (29%)
38 (100%) 17 (45%) 21 (55%)
Prediction Regarding 
Player 2's Choice
Prediction Regarding 
Player 1's Choice
 
 
Specifically, notice that all Player 1s predict Player 2 will choose L (the 
“nothing to lose” response) and 79% best respond to this prediction by choosing U.  
For Player 2s, in contrast, only a slight majority predict Player 1 will choose D ( the 
“nothing to gain” response) and of these only a slight majority, 11 versus 10, best 
respond by choosing R.  The rest of those that predict Player 1 would choose D 
apparently decide they have “nothing to lose” in any case and pick L.  The remaining 
large minority of Player 2s (45%) predicted Player 1 would choose U and virtually all 
best responded given that prediction. These results again suggest that the comparison 
processes players employ may be more complex than modeled here and also raise the 
possibility that subjects find that situations in which there is “nothing to lose” provide 
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more compelling reasons to choose one strategy over another than situations in which 
there is “nothing to gain.”   
 
Discussion 
 Game theory provides an elegant, logically compelling, description of what 
the outcomes of strategic interactions among players who are fully rational, 
computationally unconstrained and infinitely discerning with regard to payoffs will 
be.  These normative virtues notwithstanding, experiments have shown the theory is 
limited as a descriptive model of strategic interaction.  This problem has not gone 
unnoticed – indeed, John Nash, whose name graces the fundamental concept in game 
theory, is said to have abandoned the enterprise upon realizing that behavior departed 
systematically from what became known as Nash equilibrium.  Those less fatalistic, 
or maybe less realistic, have addressed the descriptive limitations of the theory 
differently – adding auxiliary assumptions of a rational ilk upon a theory already 
laden with a very strong dose of rationality. In this paper, I have taken a rather 
different tack based on three observations.  The first is that it seems plausible that if 
people misbehave vis-a-vis rationality in choices, they will probably do so in more 
complex, strategic settings.  The second is that most of the misbehavior in choice 
seems to stem from a tendency not to discriminate between magnitudes – payoffs, 
probabilities, time periods – that are in, at least a relative sense, close in value.  The 
third is that what seems to drive the misbehavior resulting from this failure to 
discriminate is the perception that there is either “nothing to gain” or “nothing to lose” 
by following one course of action over another. 
 We have examined the consequences of such reasoning in the context of 
coordination games and games of pure conflict.  Experimental results, with one 
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exception, bear out the hypotheses that follow from the assumption that players’ base 
their strategic choices on the “nothing to gain/nothing to lose” effect.  In the context 
of coordination games, we obtain an explanation for why people sometimes play 
strategies corresponding to payoff dominance (because there is “nothing to lose” by 
doing so) and sometimes play strategies corresponding to security-mindedness 
(because there is “nothing to gain” by doing otherwise).  As we have seen, these 
effects can conspire under the right circumstances to produce non-equilibrium 
outcomes. 14  
 In the context of games of conflict, we have seen that the same effects can 
produce systematic game outcomes even though these games contain no pure strategy 
equilibria.  Moreover, these systematic effects cannot be attributed to subjects playing 
mixed strategies.15  
 Taken together the approach to understanding play in games presented here 
and the evidence testing its predictions raise an interesting possibility -- that, though 
individually irrational, “nothing to gain/nothing to lose” reasoning may be adaptive, if 
not optimal, from a social standpoint to the extent that it provides people with a theory 
of focality – and one that under many circumstances produces what, to the layman if 
not the economist, are sensible outcomes. In standard game theory, coordination 
games are problematic precisely because there isn’t any guidance as to which of the 
multiple equilibria people should aim for.  With apologies in advance of exploiting a 
sort of creeping cardinality, if we add a little inability or unwillingness to discriminate 
between payoffs in coordination games, we gravitate toward payoff dominant 
equilibrium when the payoffs involved in one cell are dramatically superior to those 
                                                 
14 Although, interestingly, the outcome is an equilibrium in a transformed game in which the similar payoffs are 
equated. 
 
15 On the contrary, if there is a single concept that has been thoroughly discredited by the experimental results 
presented here it is the notion that people employ mixed strategies. 
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in the other cells in the game as in Game I-I in Table 5.  Likewise, we gravitate 
toward the security-minded equilibrium when the only real problem in the game is 
avoiding the worst possible payoffs contained in the non-equilibrium game outcomes 
(as in Game III-III in Table 5.)  That a combination of “nothing to gain” and “nothing 
to lose” effects can conspire to produce an outcome dominated by both equilibria as 
was the case with DL in Game III-I may be unfortunate but these effects 
simultaneously insure that the socially disastrous outcome UR will not occur.    
In a related vein, in conflict situations, game theory’s predictions are pretty 
grim.  However, add a little unwillingness or inability to discriminate, and we end up 
with at least a subset of possible games where both players receive an outcome which 
is jointly superior to any other available (compare the predicted outcome in Game VI-
I with the other cells in that game) and superior to anything that could be achieved 
through randomization. 
 I do not know at this point whether these types of conclusions regarding the 
potential benefits of “nothing to gain/nothing to lose” type reasoning are robust.  
What does seem beyond question at this point is that the role of such reasoning in 
games – still other types of games, more complex games, games with repetition, 
games with communication, etc. - is critical if we are to understand real strategic 
interactions. 
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